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In a context of public-policy making, I propose to consider a fundamental norm of 
epistemic parity as contributing to the justification, the acceptability and the legitimacy of 
decisions taken through deliberative processes. I also suggest that models of semi-direct 
democracy, whose constitutional foundations include the possibility of deliberations among 
all citizens sanctioned by popular votes, promote epistemic parity. 
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Be it observed that arguments used against ‘government’ action, where the government is 
entirely or mainly in the hands of a ruling class or caste, exercising wisely or unwisely a 
paternal or grandmotherly authority – such arguments lose their force just in proportion as 
the government becomes more and more genuinely the government of the people by the 





Context and practical issues 
 
The problem of the legitimacy of political decisions taken by "the ruling classes" is of great 
relevance today, even within democratic systems that favour "the government of the people by 
the people themselves". The recent "yellow vests" movement in France is a good illustration. 
On 17 November 2018, some French citizens mobilised to protest against the introduction of a 
tax on fuel prices, by organising roads or roundabouts blocks and demonstrations. Quickly, this 
initial demand extended to other social and political issues. For example, Murielle, retired, 
states that the French system is comparable to a monarchy: "We have a king as president of the 
Republic" [my translation] (Bedock et al., 2019, p. 11).  
Mainly individuals from the working classes, who do not feel heard, understood or respected 
when they speak up carry this critical discourse on government decisions (Ibid, p.1). It leads to 
three types of demands: achieving better "control of the rulers and of the most important 
political decisions", constructing «conditions for better listening on the part of representatives" 
and creating a "greater statutory and physical proximity" [my translation] (Ibid, p. 13). 
Similar cases can be mentioned, such as the problem of the "democratic deficit" at the level of 
the European institutions. For example, Kratochvil and Sychra (2019), for example, point to 
three factors explaining this democratic deficit. First, the absence of the notion of a public 
sphere at the European level (insufficiently public deliberations). Second, the psychological 
gap between the European Union and its citizens (citizen disinterest in European politics). 
Third, the fact that regulations adopted at the European level are far removed from citizens' 
preferences.  
In both cases, the issue is not so much the legitimacy of governments as the legitimacy of 
governance: the problem is not located in democratic systems per se, but in how to achieve 
democratic ideals through the exercise of legislative and/or executive power. According to 
Bekkers et al., «the idea of governance reflects the attention that should be paid to the processes 
themselves in which actors with different interests, resources and beliefs co-produce policy 
practices that they share. The paradigm shift from ‘government to governance’ gives 
government organizations a position in complex exchange networks […]». (2007, p. 22) 
The French government's strategic response to the yellow vests crisis, for example, is 
"governance-oriented". Starting in December 2019, the executive branch organised a  national 
debate («grand débat national») accessible to all citizens and aimed at fostering public 
deliberation on issues such as democracy and citizenship or ecological transition, by promoting 
and organising exchange using practical tools (websites, fora, fact sheets, etc.) (see Courant, 
2019; Rui, 2019). As for the European Commission, which affirms its will to maintain "a 
permanent dialogue with citizens" [my translation] (2019, p. 44), in 2011 it set up the "Debating 
Europe" project, "an online discussion platform based on a simple model: citizens ask questions 
- policy makers and experts respond" (Debating Europe, 2001) (see also Cmeciu & Cmeciu, 
2014).  
From the point of view of argumentation studies, problems related to «democratic deficits» are 
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both theoretical and practical. As for theoretical issues, research can contribute to identify «gaps 
between the citizens’, policymakers’ and scholarly experts’ argumentation», and for practical 
issues to improve «the way […] citizens understand, evaluate and contribute to public decision-
making on such matters of common concern as climate change or energy policies» (COST 
Committee, 2018). To address these concerns, three working groups were created within the 
APPLY project (European Network for Argumentation and Public Policy Analysis) (Ibid.): one 
focusing on the empirical study of public argumentation (data collection), another on the 
development of practical tools (concrete solutions) and the last on norms for the production and 
evaluation of public argumentation (theoretical input).  
In this paper, I deal with the last issue, raising the question of the relations between public 
argumentation processes and the legitimacy of public policies, and applying it to the Swiss 
federalist and semi-direct system case. I expand on this research question and present my 
hypotheses below, after having clarified two important theoretical insights: first, the link 
between democracy and public deliberation, and second, the particularities of the Swiss 
democratic system. 
 
Theoretical insight: democracy and public deliberation  
 
To provide an overview of the connection between democracy and public deliberation, I invoke 
John Rawls, a theoretician of liberal democracy, and Jürgen Habermas, a theoretician of 
deliberative democracy1.  
Rawls premises his political liberalism theory on "the fact of reasonable pluralism as a pluralism 
of comprehensive doctrines, including both religious and nonreligious doctrines" (Rawls, 2005, 
p. 14). Two comprehensive doctrines, e.g. Christianity and Buddhism, Kantism and 
Utilitarianism, etc., can be partially or fully opposing. Two individuals, depending on whether 
they adhere to one or another doctrine, can disagree partially or fully about the truth of a 
proposition. In contrast to the notion of comprehensive doctrine, a doctrine can be freestanding, 
"when it is not presented as derived from, or as part of, any comprehensive doctrine" that is, 
when "it contains its own normative intrinsic normative and moral ideal". (Rawls, 2005, p.42) 
For a plurality of comprehensive doctrines to coexist within a democratic political system, the 
concept of justice supporting it must be freestanding: all citizens regardless of the contradictory 
comprehensive doctrines to which they adhere must consent to it. A political system based on 
a freestanding conception is legitimate, that is all citizens "in the light of principles and ideals 
acceptable to their common human reason can endorse it" (Rawls, 2005, p.137).  
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, for example, pertains to a freestanding 
and legitimate doctrine. According to Rawls, any individual placed under a "veil of ignorance", 
i.e. a fictional situation of impartiality, would adopt as legitimate the freedom of assembly, the 
freedom of expression or the freedom to exercise her religion. Thus, in a Rawlsian approach 
freestanding political doctrines permit public deliberations. Freedom of assembly, for instance, 
ensures the right to meet under the aegis of any comprehensive doctrine; freedom of expression 
ensures the right to initiate and participate in deliberations, etc.   
Contrastingly, Habermas proposes a more pragmatic conception of democracy. In his view, 
democracy grounds in the "fact of pluralism": "U) [universalization principle] regulates only 
argumentation among a plurality of participants; second, it suggests the perspective of real-life 
argumentation, in which all affected are admitted as participants." (Habermas, 1990, p. 66)  
Therefore, within a pluralist system, a norm is valid if and only if "(U) All affected can accept 
the consequences and the side effects its general observance can be anticipated to have for the 
satisfaction of everyone's interests (and these consequences are preferred to those of known 
 
1 For an antagonistic point of view, see the conservative theory of Scruton (2001). For a more comprehensive and 
charitable account on Rawls’ and Habermas’ theories, see Herdrick (2010). 
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alternative possibilities for regulation)." (Habermas, 1990, p. 65)  
Finally, for a norm to be universal according to Habermas, those it concerns must approve it; it 
must be justified pragmatically, within a pluralistic society; and it is validated through a 
deliberative process rooted in diversity. In relation to the principle of universalization, 
Habermas hence puts forward a principle of discourse ethics (D) "only those norms can claim 
to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as 
participants in a practical discourse.  This principle of discourse ethics (D) […] already 
presupposes that we can justify our choice of a norm." (Habermas, 1990, p. 66) 
In sum, according to Habermas, there is a universal fact rather than a universal freestanding 
doctrine: all citizens of a given political system are potential participants in the practical 
discourse. On that account, deliberation is foundational because it generates, sets and modifies 
norms. Moreover, deliberation is not "sub-regulated" by some universal reasonable principle. 
Deliberation is the democracy, whose ontology is as it exists and not as someone would 
conceive it under a veil of ignorance, as in Rawls' theory. 
I now briefly summarize how public deliberation embeds in a democratic system, trying to offer 
a definition compatible with both Habermas and Rawls conceptions: 
 
1. Democracy is composed of its citizens.   
2. The citizens of a democracy adhere to plural, sometimes opposing, comprehensive doctrines. 
3. The norms constituting a democratic system apply to all citizens.  
4. The norms constituting a democratic system aim at legitimacy. 
5. For a norm to be legitimate, it must be freestanding and/or the result of a public deliberation. 
6. Public deliberation is a fact of democracy.  
 
Theoretical insight: the Swiss democratic system 
 
In this paper, I focus on federalism and semi-direct democracy as noticeable features of the 
Swiss system. According to Dosenrode, "the core of federalism is about two things: 
independence and politics, territorial politics. Creating a federation is about getting the 
advantages of being a greater entity, while keeping as much independence for the constituent 
entities as possible." (2007, p. 7) A federalist system is therefore plural by nature, since the very 
purpose of federalism is the cooperation of distinct entities within the same political system. 
Moreover, a parallel can be draw between Switzerland and the European Union, whose one of 
the greatest challenges is to organize and facilitate democratic cooperation among the Member 
states.  
Swiss semi-direct democracy exercises through three political tools at a federal level. The 
popular initiative, first, which allows citizens to submit to popular vote an extension or 
amendment to the Constitution. "For a popular initiative to succeed, those launching the 
initiative need to collect 100’000 signatures from people entitled to vote within 18 months. By 
signing such a list, people declare themselves to be in favour of the initiative. Parliament is 
responsible for examining whether the initiative respects the principles of consistency of form, 
unity of subject matter and the mandatory rules of international law. If this is not the case, 
Parliament may declare the initiative totally or partially invalid." (Swiss Confederation, 2020) 
The optional referendum, second, through which citizens can stop decisions of the legislative 
power from coming into force. From the publication of the law or decree in the Federal Gazette, 
"a referendum can take place once at least 50,000 valid signatures have been handed in to the 
Federal Chancellery, which is responsible, in the final instance, for checking the validity of the 
signatures. If the number of signatures is attained, the contested decision can be put to the vote 
of the people." (Ibid.) Third, the mandatory referendum, which provides for the consultation of 
the population for any amendment to the Constitution scheduled by the legislative power.  
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Research goal and hypotheses  
 
In this paper, I raise the question of connections between processes of public deliberation and 
legitimacy of public policies, in semi-direct systems case, such as the Swiss democracy and I 
address it through three hypotheses: 
 
1. Concepts of public deliberation and public decision-making are interrelated: the legitimacy 
of a public deliberation depends on the public decision that follows the deliberation and the 
legitimacy of a public decision depends on the public deliberation that precedes the public 
decision.  
 
2. Public decision-making and public deliberation connect to the notions of epistemic parity 
and political equality among citizens.   
 
3. Epistemic parity and political equality enhance the legitimacy of political decision-making 
processes and the legitimacy of political norms. 
 
To discuss the first hypothesis, I first clarify the definitions of public reason, public 
justification, public deliberation and public decision, before referring to Pettit’s discursive 
dilemmas (2001) to show that public deliberation does not justify a public decision, and public 
decision is not justified by a public deliberation. I then mention the notions of centripetal 
democracy and of voting space (Lacey, 2017), which frames both deliberation and public 
decision.  
To justify the second hypothesis, I discuss Talisse’s (2008) socio-epistemic justification of 
liberal democracy and Jønch-Clausen and Kappel’s deep disagreement objection (2015) and 
suggest that an operative socio-epistemic justification of liberalism should take into account a 
principle of political equality.  
To justify the third hypothesis, I challenge Jønch-Clausen and Kappel’s objection to a socio-
epistemic justification of liberalism, pointing out that this objection no longer holds in a 
deliberative-decisional political system. Eventually, I illustrate this point with the case of the 
Swiss popular initiative "For the dignity of farm animals (horned cows)", relating this case to 
the concept of political legitimacy.   
 
1. Public deliberation and public decision-making 
 
1.a. Public reason, public justification, public deliberation and public decision-making 
 
Before clarifying how public deliberation and public decision-making interrelates, I begin by 
distinguishing between the notions of "public reason", "public justification" and "public 
deliberation".  
According to Chambers, public reason "refers to the content of the reasons given within public 
justification. Here, the question focus on the types reasons appropriate to public justification. 
The adjectives most often used to describe public reasons are intelligible, accessible, acceptable 
and sharable." (2010, p. 2)  As I explained in the introduction mentioning Rawls’ and 
Habermas’ theories, the principle of public reason requires some sort of universality and is at 
least partially typological, as Chambers notes in speaking of "types reasons appropriate to 
public justification".  In other words, public reason, metaphorically exercised under a veil of 
ignorance (Rawls) or actually through a process of deliberation (Habermas), generates public 
reason(s), or justification(s). 
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Public justification, more precisely "the public of public justification": 
 
refers first to the fact that it is justification of public things, i.e., laws, constitutions, 
basic social structure; second, to the fact that the addressee of the justification is a 
public at large characterized by pluralism (this might be ideally conceived, or as an 
empirical entity, or something in between); and finally, public refers to the idea that 
justification is presented in public or by citizens acting publicly. (Chambers, 2010, 
p.2) 
 
Public deliberation, finally, "refers to the process of reason-giving" (Chambers, 2010, p.2). 
Therefore, I summarize the distinction between public reason, public justification and public 
deliberation as follows: through a process of public deliberation, based on (Rawls) or generating 
(Habermas) a principle of public reason, citizens produce public justifications. The process of 
public deliberation:  
 
1. Is about a public issue  
(content clause)  
2. Is typically expressed by people in their public capacity, e.g. as citizens or 
politicians (speaker clause) 
3. [Is expressed] in an open forum  
(context clause) 
4. [Addresses] a larger audience whose members are people in their public capacity 
(addressee clause) (COST Working Group 2, 2019, p. 4 )  
 
This definition might be questionable, however, because public justification relates to a public 
decision leading to the ratification of a public norm. Research indeed commonly distinguishes 
between deliberative and aggregative democracy. According to Peter, "the main difference 
between the two conceptions of democracy is [...] that the deliberative conception treats the 
transformative effect of public deliberation on preferences or beliefs as crucial for the 
justification of democracy and the legitimacy of democratic decisions, while the aggregative 
conception does not." (2017, p. 78) For the supporters of the aggregative conception, the 
process of deliberation connects with a democratic decision-making by majority vote. In this 
view, a public norm is justified by the vote rather than by the deliberation. For the supporters 
of the deliberative conception, on the contrary, the decision records the result of the 
deliberation, but is not contained within the justification. 
In the next sections, I suggest that the deliberative and aggregative conceptions of democracy 
are interrelated, referring to Pettit’s "discursive dilemmas" (2001). In other words, deliberation 
is not sufficient to justify an aggregate public decision and aggregate public decision is not 
sufficient to justify a deliberation. From these examples of discursive dilemmas, I then turn to 
Lacey's (2017) notion of centripetal democracy, arguing that the relation between public 
deliberation and public justification stands mainly at the level of governance, not government. 
Finally, I show that the key features of this governance relevant to the public justification of 
norms are the epistemic and political equality of citizens.  
 
1.b. Public deliberation does not justify a public decision 
 
I begin by presenting a case where a public deliberation does not justify a public decision, 
referring to the second Pettit’s discursive dilemma (2001).  
Assume that "there is a conclusion to be decided among a group of people by reference to a 
disjunction of independent or separable premises - the conclusion will be endorsed if any of the 
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premises is endorsed, and otherwise it will be rejected." (Ibid., p. 276). 
In Switzerland, for example, a right wing nationalist party (Swiss People’s Party) submitted in 
2014 a popular initiative to the debate and vote of the population. This initiative called 
"Stopping mass immigration" (Swiss Confederation, 2019) proposed an amendment to the 
Constitution, in order to restrict immigration, both for foreigners who are gainfully employed 
in Switzerland and asylum seekers. The amendment therefore includes two independent 
premises, one concerning immigrants working in Switzerland, the other asylum seekers.  
For the purposes of the example, assume that three citizens answer two questions through a 
deliberative process: Is reducing immigration of workers justified? Is reducing immigration of 
asylum seekers justified? At the end of the deliberation, their position is as follows:   
 
Disjunctive premises Is reducing immigration 








Donald yes no yes 
Mickey no yes yes 
Pluto no no no 
 
Situating with respect to the deliberative process, the majority of participants in the debate do 
not justify either the first or the second premise. Therefore, citizens should not accept the 
initiative, since neither of the two premises is justified. However, Donald and Mickey are 
somehow prejudiced. Both individually have sufficient reason to believe that the initiative 
should be accepted, Donald because he believes it is justified to reduce immigration of workers, 
Mickey because he believes it is justified to reduce immigration of asylum seekers. Therefore, 
in this case, public deliberation negates the aggregation of participants’ individual preferences, 
the majority of whom is in favour of the initiative.    
 
1.c. Public decision does not justify a public deliberation 
 
I now present the second dilemma, where a public decision does not justify a public 
decision (2001).  
Assume that "there is a conclusion to be decided among a group of people by reference to a 
conjunction of independent or separable premises — the conclusion will be endorsed if relevant 
premises are endorsed, and otherwise it will be rejected." (p.274) 
In Switzerland, for example, an environmental party (The Green Party of Switzerland) 
submitted in 2016 a popular initiative called "For a sustainable and resource-efficient economy 
(Green Economy)" (Swiss Confederation, 2016), in favour of sustainable development. The 
amendment premised on two conjunctive questions: Is the ecological threat sufficient to justify 
the promotion of a "green economy"? Is promoting a "green economy" effective in responding 
to the ecological threat? Again, assume that three citizens answer the questions through a 
deliberative process. Their position in the debate is as follows:   
 
Conjunctive premises Is the ecological threat 
sufficient to justify the 
building of a "green 
economy"?  
Is building a "green 
economy" effective in 





Daisy yes no no 
Minnie no yes no 




Situating with respect to decision-making, the majority of participants in the debate do not 
believe that the initiative should be accepted: the aggregation of individual preferences entails 
a rejection of the initiative. With respect to the deliberation, however, the two premises are 
justified by the majority. Therefore, in this case, the decision-making somehow deceives the 
"deliberative reason" of Daisy, Minnie and Fifi, because the result of deliberation does not 
reflect in participants’ individual preferences. Public decision thus denies a premises-driven 
justification in favour of the initiative.      
 
1.d. The challenge of governance and centripetal democracy 
 
Lacey (2017) recently proposed a mixed conception of democracy, neither aggregative nor 
deliberative, illustrating his position with Belgian, Swiss and European democracies’ 
cases. According to him: 
 
One standard opposition we find in democratic theory is between those who would 
see aggregation as the defining feature of democracy and those who would 
emphasize deliberation. In my view, the concept of aggregation is too thin because 
it refers to only one aspect of voting procedures, namely the counting of votes. As 
I have argued, the act of voting is presupposed by a voting space2 (compound) of 
which aggregation is an important but small part. Deliberation, on the other hand, 
has been identified as a form of discursive participation and only one permissible 
way of democratically engaging in the public sphere. Subsuming aggregation and 
deliberation respectively within the wider concepts of voting space and discursive 
participation makes implausible any major opposition between them, since voting 
spaces have been demonstrated to have a fundamental structuring effect on the 
public sphere wherein discursive participation proceeds. (2017, p. 46) 
 
In accordance with this conception of democracy, the notion of public deliberation includes that 
of public decision, both embedding under the wider concept of voting space. I thus suggest to 
add a "goal clause" to the definition of public deliberation given above, taking decision into 
account, and to define similarly public deliberation. Public deliberation:  
 
1. Is about a public issue (content clause)  
2. Is typically expressed by people in their public capacity, e.g. as citizens or 
politicians (speaker clause) 
3. [Is expressed] in an open forum (context clause) 
4.  [Addresses] a larger audience whose members are people in their public capacity 
(addressee clause) (COST Working Group 2, 2019, p. 4)  




1. Is about a public issue (content clause)  
2. Is typically made by people in their public decisional capacity (voters clause) 
3. Results in a public policy (modifies the political context of the voters) (context 
clause) 
4. Concern a larger population whose members are people in their public capacity 
 




of decision (addressee clause) 
5. Is driven by a public deliberation (justification clause) 
 
I previously mentioned the notion of governance: "the idea of governance reflects the attention 
that should be paid to the processes themselves in which actors with different interests, 
resources and beliefs co-produce policy practices that they share." (Bekkers et al., 2007, p. 22) 
This notion is in line with Lacey's theory of centripetal democracy, which "refers to the capacity 
of particular institutional arrangements to integrate diverse identities and interests within a 
singular political community." (Lacey, p. 75-76). Centripetal democratic systems hence 
function as centralizing institutions, organizing both deliberations and decisions within a voting 
space. In the next section, I advance the idea that liberal democracy can be justified if and only 
if it is conceived centripetally, namely as voting space aiming at political equality and epistemic 
parity of citizens.   
 
2. Public deliberation and epistemic position of citizens  
 
2.a. Talisse’s socio-epistemic justification of liberal democracy and Jønch-Clausen and Kappel’s 
deep disagreement objection 
 
Talisse’s argument  
 
Talisse (2008) socio-epistemic justification of liberal democracy is useful in conceptualizing 
the notion of public deliberation, because it draws on a normative conception of epistemic 
exchange similar to that of fundamental models in argumentation studies, such as pragma-
dialectics. According to Talisse, who echoes Buchanan (2004 ; 2002) and Goldman (1999), 
agents are epistemically interdependent (2008, p. 109). They form and revise their beliefs in 
accordance with a certain social model and follow socially derived epistemic habit. An 
epistemic habit is virtuous if it tends towards truth and vicious if it does not.  
The concept of "epistemic habit" could meet that of "pragma-dialectical model", which 
"consists in the first place of a procedure for testing the acceptability of standpoints critically 
in the light of the commitments the parties have assumed in the empirical reality of 
argumentative discourse". Furthermore, this model "provides a description of what 
argumentative discourse would be like if it were optimally and solely aimed at methodically 
resolving a difference of opinion about the acceptability of a standpoint on the merits." (Van 
Eemeren et al., 2015, p.112-113) 
In both accounts, epistemic exchange is regarded as a process aimed at testing the acceptability 
of beliefs or standpoints and whose outcome is function-related: if the process effectively tests 
the acceptability of beliefs or standpoints, it is virtuous, or effective. If it does not, it is vicious, 
or ineffective. However, agents cannot test all of their beliefs through virtuous, or effective, 
critical discussion. Therefore, epistemic habit refers not only to how beliefs are formed or 
revised, but also to how agents evaluate the authority of their fellows, that is, to whom and what 
extent they show "epistemic deference" (Talisse, 2008, p. 109). Epistemic interdependence of 
agents is advantageous in that it drastically reduces the cognitive cost of forming and revising 
beliefs, but also hazardous because it increases the risks of having false beliefs (for an 
evolutionary view on this matter, see Sperber, 2001). These risks are "both prudential and 
moral: they are prudential insofar as false beliefs frustrate one's deliberations about means; they 
are moral insofar as they can lead one to adopt immoral ends." (Talisse, 2008, p. 110)  
According to Talisse, liberal democratic institutions are consequently epistemically justified, 
because they "minimize the risks of dependence while maximizing the benefits of the epistemic 
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division of labor", by means of three features. They: 
 
(1) recognize individual liberties of thought, conscience, and association, all of 
which enable the free exchange of information 
(2) feature a meritocratic system of identifying experts that encourages proper 
epistemic deference  
(3) encourage a broad culture of moral egalitarianism that enables citizens 
confidently to address, question, and criticize each other and socially identified 
purported experts. (Talisse, p. 110) 
 
Jønch-Clausen and Kappel’s objection 
 
According to Jønch-Clausen and Kappel, some rational agents might nevertheless "reasonably 
reject [...] the assumption that the core institutions of liberal democracy facilitate the 
epistemically optimal exchanges of evidence and reason; indeed […] a believer may rationally 
hold that core liberal institutions put her in an epistemically worse off position" (2015, p. 377).   
For example, assume that Juliette is a "rational believer" who:  
 
(T1) operates in compliance with a set of basic epistemic norms (EN). Roughly EN 
comprises the idea that rational believers aim at believing truly, and that in doing 
so, they need to be responsive to evidence and reason. EN further holds that to hold 
a belief involves incurring an obligation to articulate one’s reasons, evidence, and 
arguments when incited to do so. Finally, to articulate one’s reasons is to enter into 




(T2) Anyone who, upon reflection, sees themselves as operating in compliance with 
EN is rationally committed to endorse the social institutions facilitating the 
epistemically best social process of evidence and reason-exchange (Ibid., p.374) 
 
So far, so good. However, it turns out that Juliette, who have been studying philosophy and 
theology for years, adheres to a dualist epistemic system (E-system); she believes that she is 
compound of a physical body and an immortal soul, capable of forming particular knowledge 
about the world independently of sensitive experience, through some practices and subjective 
experiences such as prayer, meditation or trance. Moreover, Juliette is not the only dualist agent 
in the democracy to which she belongs. She is part of a community of agents who have the 
same epistemic system.   
Juliette, like any rational agent, tends to adopt true beliefs. She is also willing to enter into a 
socio-epistemic process of exchanging reasons with other agents (T1). Furthermore, she is 
rationally committed to endorse social institutions that facilitate the best possible socio-
epistemic exchange (T2). Nevertheless, Juliette, because of her dualism, is minority. Her 
dualistic epistemic system differs from that of the majority of physicalist agents, and she knows 
it. Therefore, from Juliette's point of view, is it true that: 
 
(T3) There is a set of key liberal democratic institutions that are epistemically best 
with respect to facilitating the social process of exchange of evidence and reason? 
(Ibid, p. 374) 
 




 [Juliette] believes that enough participants in the exchange of evidence and reason 
do not share [her] E-system, then [Juliette] will not, from a first-personal 
perspective, have reason to expect that his own epistemic position will improve by 
being exposed to these other perspectives. In other words, if the dominant set of 
E-systems in the society in which [Juliette] lives is significantly at odds with central 
elements of [Juliette’s] own E-system, then [Juliette] may have no reason to seek 
exposure, or may even rationally seek to avoid exposure. (Ibid., p. 378). 
 
The crux of the problem is that, because of the existence of incompatible epistemic systems, 
Talisse’s justification of liberalism is not public. Even though any rational agent can accept 
(T1) and (T2), the "epistemic best" of the premise (T3) depends on individual epistemic 
systems. The "epistemic best" of Juliet the Dualist when she is minority, for example, is not a 
set of liberal institutions, not because these institutions are liberal but because they do not 
permit, in Juliette’s view, a free and advantageous epistemic exchange. Therefore, according to 
Jønch-Clausen and Kappel, who rely on a "deep disagreement argument", it is not true that: 
 
(A2) No-one (or almost no-one) among the members of the polity can reasonably 
rejects the premises or the inferences of the master-argument, no matter what their 
religious and moral outlook or other parts of their (reasonable) comprehensive view 
is. (p. 375)    
 
2.b. Epistemic parity supports political parity and political equality improves epistemic parity  
 
Nonetheless, I believe that Talisse's proposal is salvageable, by specifying the concept of "key 
liberal institutions", which can be look on as centripetal structures promoting political equality 
and improving epistemic parity between citizens.  
Epistemic parity is typically defined as an epistemic equality relation between two agents with 
respect to a proposition:  
 
Suppose that you and your friend independently evaluate the same factual claim—
for example, the claim that the death penalty significantly deterred crime in Texas 
in the 1980s. Each of you has access to the same crime statistics, sociological 
reports, and so on, and has no other relevant evidence. Furthermore, you count your 
friend as an epistemic peer—as being as good as you at evaluating such claims. 
(Elga, 2007, p. 484)  
 
 
If two agents are not epistemic peers with respect to a proposition, then one is the other’s 
epistemic superior or inferior. Several factors determine the epistemic expertise of an agent 
about a factual proposition or a set of propositions: Has she relevant cognitive biases? Is she 
attentive while evaluating the proposition? Does she bear sufficient evidences? etc. (Frances, 
2014)  
I suggest supplementing this conception by a definition of epistemic parity as an equivalence 
relation. Assume that Zat and Taz deliberate on a deontic proposition, for example, "We should 
introduce a tax on gasoline." Zat premises his justification on three propositions about which 
he is epistemically competent: "Global warming is real", "Greenhouse gases warm the Earth", 
"The introduction of a tax on gasoline significantly decreased greenhouse gas emissions shortly 
after its introduction in Waltonie3 in 2002". As for Taz, he does not believe that "We should 
 
3 Waltonie is a new country created in honour of Douglas Walton 
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introduce a tax on gasoline". He premises his justification on three other propositions: "The tax 
would cost 100 euros per month for a citizen driving 50 kilometres a day to go to work"; "The 
average salary of workers in our country is 2000 euros"; "100 euros per month equal 5% of the 
average salary of workers. " 
In this case, Zat and Taz are not necessarily epistemic peers regarding the propositions 
premising their deontic standpoint. Nonetheless, their justifications are equally relevant to 
justify or not the deontic norm. They are thus epistemic peers in a sense of epistemic parity as 
an equivalence relation: Zat and Taz are epistemically equally competent to justify or not a 
deontic norm.   
Consequently, for liberal institutions to "minimize the risks of [epistemic] dependence while 
maximizing the benefits of the epistemic division of labor", it is insufficient that they: 
 
(1) recognize individual liberties of thought, conscience, and association, all of 
which enable the free exchange of information. 
(2) feature a meritocratic system of identifying experts that encourages proper 
epistemic deference.  
(3) encourage a broad culture of moral egalitarianism that enables citizens 
confidently to address, question, and criticize each other and socially identified 
purported experts. (Talisse, p. 110) 
 
They should also genuinely take into account the fact of pluralism, i.e., recognize the 
considerable number of cases where citizens, in relation to a deontic proposition or a deontic 
propositional domain, have poles apart positions and epistemically equivalent justifications. 
Indeed, because liberal institutions generate public and sometimes coercive norms, free 
epistemic exchange serves as much to prevent undesirable policies than harmful policies. 
Moreover, it provides citizens with the opportunity to achieve personal ends in a public setting 
by dint of persuasion. 
To sum up, liberal institutions should be effective in conciliating a global justification of norms, 
whose value lies on public reason, with an individual justification, whose value lies in the 
desirable or the undesirable from a first-person perspective. In this sense, epistemic parity as an 
equivalence relation backups political equality. 
According to Dahl, ideal political equality requires five key-features:  
 
1. "Effective participation": all citizens must have the right to participate in public 
deliberations on a policy.  
2. "Equality in voting": all citizens must have the right to participate in vote on the 
adoption of a policy.  
3. "Gaining enlightened understanding": all citizens must have access to 
information about the new policy and alternative possibilities. 
4. "Final control of the agenda" : all citizens must have the right to propose new 
policies for debate and voting at any time, and to question previously adopted 
policies. 
5. "Fundamental rights": each of these features is a fundamental right. (2006, p. 9) 
 
The notion of "key liberal institutions" can now be specified to match the properties of an ideal 
political equality: liberal institutions should tend towards epistemic parity as an equivalence 
relation between citizens, that is, towards ideal political equality. These centripetal institutions 
do not function as governments, since the demos governs itself, but as governance.   
Consequently, epistemic parity between citizens, as an equality relation this time, is in turn 
enhanced. Zat and Taz, freely exchanging about deontic propositions and mutually recognizing 
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as epistemically equivalent, are in ideal conditions to form and revise their beliefs. Zat perhaps 
does not know that global warming is a reality. However, since this knowledge is not considered 
more relevant than his own to the deontic proposal to be evaluated, he is well positioned to 
adopt it in a climate of mutual epistemic trust. (see Almassi, 2012) He also has the opportunity 
to try to improve his expertise on the subject and confront his opponent on his own ground. At 
a governmental level, in such a framework, institutions perform a role of facilitators and 
organisers of the deliberations, e.g. by synthesising citizens' views and justifications, organising 
spaces for debate, etc.  
A solution to Pettit’s discursive dilemmas now appears. With the first dilemma, we had a case 
where public deliberation does not justify public decision (Pettit, 2001):  
 
 
Disjunctive premises Is reducing immigration 








Donald yes no yes 
Mickey no yes yes 
Pluto no no no 
 
 
Considering deliberation only, Donald and Mickey are somehow prejudiced in this case, 
because deliberative justification is at odds with their individual justifications. In a situation of 
ideal political equality however, this deliberation hinges from the outset on a principle of 
epistemic parity as equivalence, since it tends towards a voting closure of the process. The 
system thus acknowledges political equivalency of the participants, even though their 
standpoints oppose.  
Furthermore, the system organising deliberations and votes must make available sufficient tools 
to ensure that every participant has access to the views of opponents and to a comprehensive 
picture of the debate. Therefore, at the time of the vote, citizens can choose either to take into 
account the result of the deliberation or their individual preferences. If the outcome of the vote 
matches the outcome of the deliberation, then the norm is justified by "deliberative reason." If, 
on the contrary, the result of the vote aggregates individual preferences and denies "deliberative 
reason", then the norm is justified by the principle of epistemic parity as an equivalence relation, 
that is, by the principle of political equality. Moreover, the process can be started over at any 
time. Pluto feeling prejudiced with respect to deliberative reason, for example, has the right to 
propose later to repeal the text of law about immigration of workers, namely to eliminate the 
conjunction, knowing that it is his best chance to win.   
With the second dilemma, we had a case where public decision does not justify a public 
deliberation (Pettit, 2001): 
 
  
Conjunctive premises Is the ecological threat 
sufficient to justify the 
building of a "green 
economy"?  
Is building a "green 
economy" effective in 





Daisy yes no no 
Minnie no yes no 





Considering decision only, the "deliberative reason" of Daisy, Minnie and Fifi is somehow 
deceived. Both premises are indeed justified by the deliberation, but the justification does not 
materialize in the aggregated result. In an ideal system of political equality, however, the vote 
is inscribed from the outset in a system that favours epistemic equality, since the vote closing 
the process results from a free deliberation organized by the governance. It is therefore assumed 
that participants, at the end of the process and through deliberation, are epistemic peers capable 
of an informed choice. Daisy or Minnie may thus accept the initiative even though they do not 
accept the justification of a premise, opting for the deliberative reason. They may as well not 
reconsider their position and reject the initiative anyway, opting for their individual preferences. 
In both cases, again, the adopted norm is legitimized, either through epistemic parity as an 
equality relation, which enables citizens to draw to the same rational conclusions all together, 
or through epistemic parity as an equivalence relation, which enables citizens' differing 
justifications for the same norm to be considered equally rational. And again, legitimacy is 
enhanced by the possibility to restart the process at any time. 
 
3. Deep disagreement, cow horns and legitimacy   
 
Finally, I show why specifying the notion of voting space and epistemic parity as equality and 
equivalence make it possible to reject a deep disagreement objection against the socio-epistemic 
justification of liberal democracy, referring to Boltanski and Thévenot's theory of justification 
(2006) and the Swiss initiative "For the dignity of farm animals (horned cows)". Elaborating on 
this deep disagreement case, I explain why the debate can still take place in an epistemically 
satisfactory and advantageous way for all citizens and why the result is legitimized and 
legitimate.  
 
3.1. Deep disagreement  
 
In my view, Jønch-Clausen and Kappel's definition of deep disagreement is questionable. The 
epistemic systems of two agents might indeed be more or less similar or dissimilar, but the 
existence of total incompatibilities that inhibit the debate is doubtful if these individuals are 
rational.  
Fogelin (1985) is the first to suggest the canonical example of abortion debate: deep 
disagreement occurs when "parties on opposite sides of the abortion debate can agree on a wide 
range of biological facts-when the heartbeat begins in the foetus, when brain waves first appear, 
when viability occurs, etc., yet continue to disagree on the moral issue." (p. 6) In such case, in 
my viw, the difficulty is not so much a problem concerning the justification of factual 
propositions, but rather of deontic propositions, like "Abortion should/should not be legal in 
the first three months of pregnancy".  
It is, actually, a particular case of epistemic equivalence. Two justifications of a deontic 
proposition D being part of poles apart epistemic systems, for example a dualistic system and 
a physicalist system, can however be recognized as equivalent, with respect to each agent’s 
epistemic system. Crumb and Pebble, for example, might disagree about the right to abortion 
in the first three months of the foetus. Crumb believes in the right to life in an absolute and 
coherent way (he is also a vegetarian; he does not kill insects, etc.) Pebble believes that the right 
of women to choose whether to have a child is fundamental. In this case, Crumb and Pebble 
can rationally recognize each other as epistemic peers, in the equivalence sense, with respect to 
the deontic proposition D. The difficulty does not seem much more fundamental than the simple 
fact of pluralism, on which the issue relocates.  




The fact that people may choose among a number of different ways of establishing 
equivalence raises questions about how these approaches are interrelated, and how 
people deal with such complexity. We have already suggested, however, that the 
order of each polity makes it possible to reduce complexity by reducing forms of 
generality characteristic of other polities to instances of particularity. (2006, p. 127) 
 
In their economy of worth theory, the authors argue for the idea that the social space is composed 
of a plurality of worlds:  
 
1. "The inspired world", whose principle is "the outpouring of inspiration." (p. 159) 
The recognized evidence in this world is "the certainty of intuition." (p. 163) 
 
2. "The domestic world", whose principle is "the engenderment according to 
tradition." (p. 165) The recognized evidences in this world are "the exemplary 
anecdotes." (p. 176) 
 
3. "The world of fame", whose principle is "the reality of public opinion." (p. 178) 
The recognize evidence in this world is "the evidence of success." (p. 184)  
 
 4. "The civic world", whose principle is "the preeminence of collectives." (p. 185) 
The recognized evidences in this world are "the legal texts." (p. 193) 
 
5.  "The market world", whose principle is "competition." (p. 196). The recognized 
evidences in this world are "money, benefit, result, and payback." (p. 202)  
 
6. "The industrial world", whose principle is "the efficiency." The recognized 
evidence in this world is a "measure." (p.211)  
 
 
According to Boltanski and Thévenot, the coexistence of these worlds is a social fact. From a 
political perspective, a legitimate system should hence allow the coexistence of these worlds 
and the free evaluation, through deliberation, of their importance with respect to one or another 
deontic norm. In addition, any agent should be able in principle of rationally recognizing the 
existence of these spaces as valid value systems, for herself and for the agents with whom she 
interacts, as well as of calculating and understanding the equivalence of these value systems 
within a specific case of disagreement.  
Consequently, disagreement about abortion would not be a clash of epistemic systems, since 
both parties recognize the same biological facts. Rather, for the specific deontic norm 
concerning abortion, agents refer to different worlds, which do not prevent them to 
acknowledge each other’s system. If the other’s world of reference is not acknowledge, then 
epistemic parity as an equivalence relation is not recognized. The conflict is therefore more a 
conflict about relevance of values than of rationality.  
 
3.2. Socio-epistemic justification of a liberal democracy in which citizens can debate about the 
dignity of horned cows  
 
For a socio-epistemic justification of liberal democracy to hold, in addition to allowing free 
epistemic exchange while minimizing the risks associated with epistemic dependence, liberal 
institutions must also be able to foster the recognition of types of "social worlds" such as those 
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described by Boltanski and Thévenot. This is the social side of a socio-epistemic justification, 
and the epistemic justification of a social world, in which agents adapt not only their factual 
knowledge, but also their knowledge of the exchange processes, and of the types of values 
underlying these exchanges. 
Within systems favouring a "centripetal" type of governance, this type of exchanges can be 
encouraged, for example, by tools of direct democracy, such as the popular initiative. This tool 
allows in principle to submit to public deliberation and vote any proposal to amend the 
Constitution. In Switzerland, submitting a popular initiative necessitates the collection of 
100,000 signatures, which approximately represents 1.8% of the voters. Therefore, a minority 
can bring into the voting space, comprising both deliberation and decision, any policy 
proposition.  
A mountain farmer, for example, launched a signatures collection in 2016, to propose an 
amendment to the Constitution called "For the dignity of farm animals (horned cows)", the aim 
of which was to introduce financial bonuses for owners of cows and goats who do not dehorn 
their animals. According to the proponent of the initiative expressing publicly: "Nature must be 
treated with respect, and cows must be considered as full-fledged beings. If their horns were 
meaningless, Mother Nature would not give them at birth." (L’Illustré, 2017). This statement 
situates somewhere between the "inspired world" and the "domestic world" of Boltanski and 
Thévenot. Nevertheless, because it is a subject of deliberation and vote, citizens, who cannot 
ignore the framework in which the proponent’s justification is inscribed, discuss it in the public 
sphere.  
In addition, when a group of citizens or a citizen submits and defends an initiative, she enters 
into a process of epistemic exchange and evaluation of value systems. That is, she must be able 
to situate herself with respect to these systems in such a way as to propose arguments 
compatible with each of them, ideally. In the cow’s horns initiative case, for example, these 
were arguments such as "20% of dehorned animals suffer from long-term pain, as a study by 
the University of Bern has shown", which is at the junction between "the inspired world" and 
"the industrial world" ; or, "dehorning only appeared with the industrialization of agriculture", 
which is between a rejection of the "industrial world" and a validation of the "domestic world." 
(Hornkuh initiative website, 2020). Sadly for the cows, a significant majority of Swiss citizens 
rejected the initiative. However, a genuine debate took place and can be started over at any 
time. 
With such a conception of liberal institutions, the deep disagreement objection again a social-
epistemic justification of liberalism seems to fall. Even if the epistemic system or the world of 
an agent is minority and even if this system is the only one to which she refers, she still can 
propose a deontic norm to the debate, locating it within her own framework. Moreover, she can, 
through the debate, estimate the number of citizens locating in the same world with respect to 
this deontic norm and acquire knowledge about the worlds in which other citizens locate. 
Therefore, there is no reason for a citizen, for instance Juliette the Dualist, to "reject [...] the 
assumption that the core institutions of liberal democracy facilitate the epistemically optimal 
exchanges of evidence and reason" and to "hold that core liberal institutions put her in an 
epistemically worse off position" (Jønch-Clausen and Kappel , 2015, p. 377), since epistemic 
equivalence is recognized as fundamental principle.  
 
3.3. Legitimacy of the political system and legitimacy of norms   
 
To sum up my argument, I suggest two necessary properties for the legitimacy of a political 
system. A political system is legitimate if and only if: 
 
1. The system admits epistemic parity as an equivalence between citizens, that is, it admits that, 
17 
 
for a norm N, the justification can locate into any social world SW.  
2. The system promotes epistemic parity as an equality relation between citizens, that is, it 
promotes free epistemic exchange between citizens. 
 
A political norm is legitimate if and only if:  
 
1. It is justified by a deliberative and decision-making process admitting epistemic parity as an 
equivalence relation and favouring epistemic parity as an equality relation. 
2. It is justified either by the deliberative reason, or by aggregated individual preferences, or by 
both. 
3. Its justification locates in at least one social world, to which at least one citizen refers. 
4. It can be revised at any time by any citizen.  
 
4. Conclusion  
 
In conclusion, I would like to anticipate a jingoism objection against my argument. I believe 
that tools of direct democracy improve political equality among citizens and I tend to believe 
they improve the legitimacy of decisions. I also believe that this system is criticisable in many 
respects. For instance, in Switzerland, the injustices moderated by political equality tend to 
transfer to non-voting minorities, such as immigrants; in cases where the aggregative reason is 
preferred and contravenes the deliberative reason, decisions sometimes violate international 
law or the human rights convention; and so on. (see Giraux, 2013; Donovan, 2019). 
Furthermore, I do not believe that a system of direct or semi-direct democracy is the only one 
that can meet the legitimacy criteria suggested above. As Bedock et al. point out in their studies 
on the yellow vests crisis in France, protesters do not necessarily call for an end of the 
representative system in favour of a semi-direct or direct democracy. Rather, they call out for 
"reinventing representation […] according to three main principles: more control of elected 
representatives, elected representative as spokespersons who listen to citizens and a better 
statutory and geographical proximity between the representatives and the represented." [my 
translation] (Bedock et al., 2019, p. 13.) They call out, in other words, for a government which 
would be more genuinely "the government of the people by the people themselves." (Ritchie, 
1869, p. 64) How can this democratic ideal be achieved? By listening those who protest and by 
recognizing the reality and the equivalence of the social worlds. Governments should not be 
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